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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PENALTY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN DEPORTATION FOR
CRIMES
MAUREEN SWEENEY* AND HILLARY SCHOLTEN**
INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2010, in the case of Padilla v. Kentucky, the Supreme Court
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases includes the
right for non-citizen defendants to receive accurate advice about the
immigration consequences of any plea agreement.1 This holding proceeded
from the Court’s prior conclusion that deportation which results from a
criminal conviction is, as a matter of federal law, “an integral part—indeed,
sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on
This
noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”2
acknowledgment of the extent to which deportation proceedings can be
“enmeshed” with criminal convictions and, indeed, that deportation can be part
of a criminal penalty,3 marks a sharp departure from the Court’s century-long
characterization of immigration consequences as “purely civil”4 and opened
the door, at least in the Padilla case, for the extension of a constitutional
protection traditionally reserved to the criminal realm into the arena of
immigration. At the same time, it opened the door to arguments that other

* Clinical Instructor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. B.A. Wesleyan
University; J.D. Yale Law School. Thanks to Alice Johnson for expert research assistance and to
all my colleagues at UM Carey, who support the work of the Immigration Clinic and my own
scholarly work. I dedicate this article to my co-author, Hillary Scholten, whose thoughtfulness
and intellectual and moral rigor made this thinking and writing project always interesting,
challenging, and exciting; and to the clients of the Immigration Clinic who, like many of us, are
not perfect, but continually remind me why “the principle of forgiveness and the doctrine of
redemption” are so deep in our philosophy and so vital to the human experience (with a respectful
nod to Justice Douglas’s dissent in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)).
** Hillary Scholten completed her J.D. at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School
of Law in December 2011. Prior to law school, she worked for an extended period as a Board of
Immigration Appeals Accredited Representative, representing low-income immigrants in a
variety of immigration matters. She is incredibly thankful to Maureen Sweeney for the
opportunity to co-author this article.
1. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
2. Id. at 1480 (footnote omitted).
3. Id. at 1481.
4. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729 (1893).
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constitutional protections should perhaps apply to immigrants facing
deportation, especially those facing deportation as a consequence for crimes
committed.5
It remains to be seen, however, how far courts will go in working out the
implications of the high Court’s statement and what additional protections, if
any, may be found appropriate for individuals facing deportation. The
language and logic of Padilla arguably support the proposition that if
deportation is part of a criminal penalty, other protections afforded criminal
defendants should extend to removal proceedings and to the removal sanction,
at least where these result directly from convictions. Such protections might
include prohibitions against the imposition of ex post facto laws,
disproportionate penalties, or even a right to counsel in removal proceedings.6
On the other hand, it is possible that courts will decline any invitation to extend
the decision’s reach beyond its specific terms. Padilla crossed the bright-line
divide between civil and criminal characterizations of removal as a sanction for
crime, but will it prove to be “the camel’s nose under the tent” that will
completely overturn a century’s jurisprudence on deportation7 or will it end up
being a high-water mark for protection of noncitizens?
For purposes of this Article, we are taking the Padilla Court at its word
that deportation triggered solely by a criminal conviction is a part of the
penalty for the underlying criminal behavior, and we begin to explore the
question of what other constitutional limits might be placed on the imposition

5. The decision has prompted a plethora of articles, trainings, and symposia on its possible
implications. See, e.g., other authors’ arguments presented in this issue, which were presented at
Saint Louis University School of Law Symposium: A New Era for Plea Bargaining and
Sentencing? The Aftermath of Padilla v. Kentucky (Feb. 25, 2011); Peter L. Markowitz,
Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299 (2011); Derek Wikstrom, Note, “No
Logical Stopping Point”: The Consequences of Padilla v. Kentucky’s Inevitable Expansion, 106
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1845815; Symposium,
Crossing the Border: The Future of Immigration Law and Its Impact on Lawyers, 45 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 301 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Status as Punishment: A Critical
Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2010, at 21 [hereinafter Chin & Love, Status as
Punishment]; Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky: The Right to
Counsel and the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 18
[hereinafter Love & Chin, Right to Counsel and Collateral Consequences]; Kevin Ruser, Padilla
v. Kentucky: “Crimmigration” Law Goes Constitutional, 13 NEB. LAW. 13 (2010).
6. As others have very persuasively argued, the decision also has important and potentially
far-reaching implications for the imposition of other “collateral” consequences of convictions as
well. See, e.g., Love & Chin, Right to Counsel and Collateral Consequences, supra note 5, at
22–23; Chin & Love, Status as Punishment, supra note 5, at 31. Some courts have already begun
to apply Padilla’s requirement of counsel to consequences other than deportation. See, e.g.,
Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Padilla to a case
involving involuntary commitment following sex offense conviction).
7. Markowitz, supra note 5, at 8.
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of that punishment.8 We choose to begin the exploration of what possible
criminal procedure protections might apply to criminal deportations by
considering the principle, grounded in the Eighth Amendment,9 that a penalty
should be proportionate to the crime it punishes. The appropriateness of any
given punishment is assessed in large part by how fitting it is to the crime
committed, and the Eighth Amendment governs the boundaries of permissible
punishment by forbidding punishment that is “cruel and unusual.”10 Within
that prohibition, the Supreme Court has recognized that a punishment should
This requirement of
be proportionate to the crime it punishes.11
proportionality, diminished though it may be in modern application, is at the
heart of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The State must
not enact a punishment more severe than is justified by the crime that was
committed. This proportionality principle is fundamental to our sense of just
punishment. Along with the prohibition against physical torture, the
proportionality principle is one of the most essential limitations in preserving a
sense of fairness in and the integrity of the criminal justice system, and in
protecting the individual from overreaching by the coercive state. It goes to
the heart of both aspects of the special interests at stake in criminal
proceedings—the liberty interests of the individual and the institutional
integrity of the system through which punishment is imposed.12
The proportionality principle is also wholly absent from our current law of
deportation for crimes, which has been expanded and rigidified over the last
two decades to the point that it now imposes automatic and irrevocable
deportation for any so-called “aggravated felony.”13 This category imposes
deportation equally for, among other offenses, murder, petty theft, aggravated
rape, and failure to appear in court.14 Similarly, the sanction is the same

8. There are a number of other possible constitutionally-based protections. U.S. CONST.
amend. VI (the right to counsel); id. (the right to trial by jury); id. (the right to confront one’s
accusers); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (the right to protection against ex post facto laws); U.S. CONST.
amend. V (the right to protection against self-incrimination); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (the right to
protection from impermissibly vague laws); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (the right to protection
from cruel and unusual punishments, including disproportionate punishment).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
10. Id.
11. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
12. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (stating heightened protections for criminal
defendant are justified both by the strong liberty interests of individual defendants and by
society’s interest in the reliability and resulting moral force of the criminal justice system); see
also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424−27
(1979).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006).
14. Id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining the broad range of offenses which qualifies as an “aggravated
felony”); see discussion infra Part II.B.
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regardless of an individual’s history or connections in the community and
applies equally to an undocumented individual who entered the country
without permission yesterday and to a long-term lawful permanent resident
who may have deep roots in the community, such as dependent U.S. citizen
family members or honorable military service.15 Much of the sense of injustice
that results from the operation of our current criminal deportation law comes
from recognition of the blatant disproportion between the sanction of
automatic deportation and the circumstances under which it is imposed.
In addition to the centrality of proportion to our sense of just punishment,
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is an attractive place to begin exploring
Padilla’s reach because the jurisprudence has already been extended to
prohibit certain non-criminal sanctions where these were found to be penal in
nature, even if not in name or explicit intent.16 The Court has held that the
Amendment limits the government’s power to punish, even when the explicitly
stated purpose of a statutory sanction is remedial, when the provision in fact
serves—at least in part—the goals of punishment.17 This precedent means that
Eighth Amendment analysis need not rely on a firm distinction between
criminal and civil proceedings but can rather be based on the effective punitive
purpose or function of a sanction.18 The Padilla Court’s statement that
deportation for crimes is a penalty19 lends support to an Eighth Amendment
analysis, even though it stops short of challenging the “civil” characterization
of removal proceedings.
Finally, in considering where first to inquire as we peek through the door
Padilla opened, we have considered the fact that Eighth Amendment
protections in the criminal realm have been severely weakened in recent

15. See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 338 (2000)
(noting that “extremely compelling equities” are irrelevant under the current statutory scheme).
16. See id. at 319–25.
17. E.g., Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 621–22 (1993) (finding that civil forfeiture
constitutes punishment and is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive
Fines Clause); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–04 (1958) (plurality opinion) (finding a
nominally non-penal provision imposing denationalization for desertion to be punishment and
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). But
see United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292 (1996) (refusing to subject in rem civil forfeitures
to the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on double jeopardy).
18. See Pauw, supra note 15, at 321−24, and Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation,
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651 (2009), for a discussion of the punitive nature of deportation and
corresponding limits that could be placed on it pursuant to the Eighth and Fifth Amendment
limitations on the imposition of punishment.
19. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
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decades.20 In fact, this objection was raised by every criminal lawyer to whom
we have mentioned this project: Why make the effort to come within the scope
of such a toothless constitutional guarantee? It is undeniable that while the
principle of proportionality has been upheld, the Eighth Amendment has
provided little concrete protection to defendants in the criminal realm for many
years, as courts have proved willing to defer to virtually any sentencing policy
decision made by a legislature, including mandatory minimum and recidivist
sentencing schemes, no matter how absurd their results in individual cases.21
In this context, the Court has been largely unwilling to overturn
legislatures’ decisions about appropriate sentencing schemes out of strong
deference to legislative expertise in policy-making.22 However, we argue that
this deference should not be applied to criminal deportation law because this
law was never considered by Congress as a sentencing policy, and courts,
therefore, have room for a more robust review of the proportionality of
deportation for any given crime or set of crimes. We also take hope from the
Court’s decision just last term, Graham v. Florida, in which it held that the
punishment of life without the possibility of parole was cruel and unusual
when imposed on a juvenile offender who commits a non-homicide crime.23
The Graham Court was unwilling to defer to the majority of state legislatures
which allowed such a sentence, finding that “the Court must determine in the
exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in question
violates the Constitution.”24 The holding and reasoning in Graham provide
additional support for examining the constitutionality of deportation as a
sanction for certain criminal violations.
Ultimately, like other immigration practitioners, we recognize the
epidemic of disproportionately harsh deportations being carried out in this
country for relatively minor offenses25 and feel that even a relatively weak
recognition that a penalty should be proportionate provides a better backstop
than the current criminal removal scheme, which requires no proportionality
whatsoever and, in the case of the vast number of “aggravated felonies,”
actually prohibits an immigration judge or any other decision maker from

20. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment) (“Our decisions recognize that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause encompasses a narrow proportionality principle.”).
21. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (plurality opinion).
22. See id. at 24.
23. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
24. Id. at 2022 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)).
25. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, Paterson Pardons Six Immigrants Facing Deportation Over Old
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2010, at A25 (describing crimes with disproportionately severe
penalties).
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exercising discretion in deciding whether to impose deportation.26 For these
reasons, we have chosen to begin our exploration of possible post-Padilla
extensions of constitutional safeguards with a look at the opportunities and
challenges attendant in contesting certain crime-related deportations as
disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
It should be noted that our piece is limited in scope. For example, though
we think it is a serious question, we will not address whether society, as
represented by the government, has a strong enough interest in policing its
borders and the content of its community to override constitutionally based
protections for individuals (the plenary powers doctrine). Heartened by
Padilla’s willingness to rely on the constitutional rights of the individual, we
leave that question for another day. Neither will we address the question of
whether it is desirable or appropriate, even if Padilla allows it, to extend
criminal-style constitutional protections to deportation for crimes—we will
assume that it is. Finally, we will not spell out the details of what a litigation
strategy or remedy in such a challenge to proportionality would look like.
What the Article will do is propose a theoretical framework for
understanding how current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence can support the
conclusion that deportation for certain crimes constitutes impermissibly cruel
and unusual punishment. Part I will summarize the Supreme Court’s Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence on cruel and unusual punishment, addressing the
analysis the Court uses in two types of challenges. Part II traces the history of
the Supreme Court’s characterization of the law of deportation for crimes, the
changes that law has undergone in recent decades, and the Court’s treatment of
criminal deportation in Padilla v. Kentucky. Finally, Part III will explain how
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should overlap with the law of criminal
deportation to result in a robust review of proportionality in deportation.
26. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) (prohibiting cancellation of removal for permanent
residents convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1101(f)(8) (excluding persons convicted of an
aggravated felony from being classified as a “person of good moral character”); id. §
1229b(b)(1)(B) (limiting cancellation of removal for nonpermanent residents to persons of good
moral character); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.65(a) (2011) (prohibiting suspension of deportation for persons
convicted of an aggravated felony); 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (prohibiting voluntary departure for
persons convicted of an aggravated felony); id. § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (limiting voluntary departure to
persons of good moral character for five years prior to application); 8 C.F.R. § 1244.4
(disqualifying persons convicted of any felony from temporary protected status). Individuals
convicted of aggravated felonies are even barred from some kinds of humanitarian relief, from
persecution in the form of asylum, and in many circumstances, the more limited withholding of
removal, as well. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (noting persons convicted of an aggravated
felony are considered “to have been convicted of a particularly serious crime”); id. §
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (prohibiting persons convicted of a particularly serious crime from obtaining
asylum); id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (allowing removal to a country where life or freedom would be
threatened if a person convicted of a particularly serious crime was determined to be a danger to
the community).
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I. THE NATURE OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: A SUMMARY OF THE
SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE ON THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S FINAL
CLAUSE
Since the passage of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
struggled to find a clear and succinct doctrine for determining what constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. This struggle is due in part to the changing
nature of punishment in this country.27 We no longer draw and quarter humans
or burn them alive for committing certain crimes. As our national attitudes
regarding humane punishment change, so too does the reach of the Eighth
Amendment.28
The Court has also struggled to find a united approach in which to ground
its interpretation of the Amendment. On the one hand, the Court’s decisions
have steadfastly maintained that “[t]he concept of proportionality is central to
the Eighth Amendment,”29 which embodies the “precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense.”30
On the other hand, it has been deeply divided within those decisions, with
Justices disagreeing on everything from the existence of such a concept or
principle, to the role of the judiciary in making judgments about its application,
to the scope of any constitutional guarantee in its application in a particular
sentence. The Court’s recent opinion in Graham v. Florida gave a good
summary of the Court’s “closely divided” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
over the last few decades.31 The complex and fractured state of the analysis is
illustrated by the fact that the current legal standard for individualized
proportionality review was established in Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, a decision that included not only a majority

27. For example, barbaric punishment and torture were long ago recognized as cruel and
unusual, but today there are still punishments that offend our modern standards of decency and
are thus unconstitutional. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–03 (1976) (“[T]he
Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments. The Amendment embodies
‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . ,’ against
which we must evaluate penal measures. . . . These elementary principles establish the
government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration.” (citations omitted)); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463
(1947) (plurality opinion) (“The traditional humanity of modern Anglo-American law forbids the
infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence.”).
28. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (“The Amendment ‘draw[s] its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”
(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion))).
29. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010).
30. Id. (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910)).
31. Id. at 2021–22.
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and concurring opinion but also three dissenting opinions.32 Graham itself
consists of a majority opinion, two separate concurrences, and two dissents.33
Despite these divisions in the Court, however, a jurisprudence has
emerged. The Court considers two types of challenges to the proportionality of
a particular sentence. The first type of challenge asks whether the imposition
of any number of years of incarceration is excessive as compared with the
The Court “‘does not require strict
crime that was committed.34
proportionality between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme
sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.’”35 The second type
Court considers is a challenge against a particular sentencing practice.36 This
categorical challenge considers whether a sentence, every time it is applied a
certain way, can ever be proportionate.37 While historically this kind of
challenge has primarily been levied against the application of the death
penalty, just last term in Graham, the Court entertained and upheld a
categorical challenge to a non-death penalty sentence.38
The Court’s analysis with each type of challenge is somewhat different,
but in both, the overarching principle is to balance the severity of the
individual’s crime with the severity of the punishment.39 In assessing the
severity of the crime, the Court evaluates not only the circumstances of the
offense but also the characteristics of the offender to determine if there is any
increased or decreased moral culpability. The characteristics of the offender
can be relevant to his or her moral culpability and thus the appropriateness of a
penalty: The Court has required a mitigation of severe penalties for those with
diminished moral culpability, such as juveniles40 and individuals with
intellectual disabilities,41 and has allowed increasingly severe punishments for
those with increased moral culpability, such as repeat offenders.42

32. 501 U.S. 957, 998–1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
33. 130 S. Ct. 2011.
34. Id. at 2021.
35. Id. at 2021 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
36. Id. at 2021.
37. Id. at 2022.
38. Id. at 2034.
39. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021.
40. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that capital punishment of
individuals who were under eighteen at the time they committed their capital crime is prohibited
by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
41. E.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that executions of mentally
retarded criminals were “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited by the Eighth Amendment).
42. E.g., Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76–77 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11,
29–31 (2003) (plurality opinion); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284–85 (1980); Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374–75 (1982) (per curiam).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2011]

PENALTY AND PROPORTIONALITY IN DEPORTATION FOR CRIMES

19

Both types of analysis, however, are largely shaped by the Court’s deep
deference to the enactments of the legislative branch, which it considers to be
the proper branch to make sentencing policy decisions and to express societal
values in sentencing. Often, the Court is content to defer completely to the
legislature’s weighing of the factors identified above. The across-the-board
importance of this legislative deference is striking given the divisions among
Justices as to other principles of the jurisprudence. As we explain, this
legislative deference also plays an important role in thinking about how Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence might be applied to criminal deportation.
A.

Grossly Disproportionate Individual Sentences

The extent to which the Court will allow the scales of justice to tip in favor
of severe punishments and still find them to be proportional to the crime has
arguably increased over the years. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Harmelin v.
Michigan articulated the current standard for interpreting the proportionality of
a term-of-years sentence as compared with the crime that was committed.43 In
Harmelin, the Supreme Court upheld Mr. Harmelin’s life sentence after he was
convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine.44 The life sentence was
mandatory under Michigan law.45 It is Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion
in the case that is controlling, which holds that the proportionality guarantee of
cruel and unusual punishment is not extinct, as some contend, but that it is in
fact “narrow.”46
Justice Kennedy begins his opinion by recognizing that the Court’s
analysis of Eighth Amendment issues is far from clear, but that there were
some emergent guiding principles that were foundationally present in the
majority of cases.47 These principles are as follows:
Principle One: “[T]he fixing of prison terms for specific crimes involves a
substantive penological judgment that, as a general matter, is ‘properly within
the province of legislatures, not courts.’”48 Justice Kennedy recognized that
whether sentencing is viewed as a moral or political issue, it provokes deeply

43. 501 U.S. at 998–1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
44. Id. at 961 (plurality opinion).
45. Id. at 961 n.1 (“Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 19901991) provides a mandatory sentence of life in prison for possession of 650 grams or more of
‘any mixture containing [a schedule 2] controlled substance’; § 333.7214(a)(iv) defines cocaine
as a schedule 2 controlled substance. Section 791.234(4) provides eligibility for parole after 10
years in prison, except for those convicted of either first-degree murder or ‘a major controlled
substance offense’; § 791.233b[1](b) defines ‘major controlled substance offense’ as, inter alia, a
violation of § 333.7403.”).
46. Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
47. Id. at 998.
48. Id. (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

20

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:11

conflicting ideas.49 He concluded that “[t]he efficacy of any sentencing system
cannot be assessed absent agreement on the purposes and objectives of the
penal system. And the responsibility for making these fundamental choices
and implementing them lies with the legislature.”50 Justice Kennedy’s listing
of legislative deference as the foremost principle guiding consideration of the
proportionality of a particular sentence reflects the preeminence of this factor
in Supreme Court case law on the topic.51
Principle Two: “[T]he Eighth Amendment does not mandate adoption of
any one penological theory.”52 Justice Kennedy argued that there is no
preference within the Constitution for retribution or deterrence, for example,
nor for mandatory or discretionary laws.53
Principle Three: “[M]arked divergences both in underlying theories of
sentencing and in the length of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often
beneficial, result of the federal structure.”54 Thus, it is inevitable that certain
states will treat their criminals more harshly than others.55
Principle Four: “[P]roportionality review by federal courts should be
informed by ‘objective factors to the maximum possible extent.’”56 One can
easily and objectively differentiate capital and non-capital punishment. It is
not so easy, however, to objectively differentiate terms of years. The Court
noted that the relative lack of objective standards concerning terms of
imprisonment has meant that “[o]utside the context of capital punishment,
successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences [are]
exceedingly rare.”57
Principle Five: “The Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme
sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.”58 Principles one
through four inform and support principle five, Kennedy explained.59
49. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(“As a moral or political issue [the punishment of offenders] provokes intemperate emotions,
deeply conflicting interests, and intractable disagreements.” (quoting DAVID GARLAND,
PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 1 (1990))).
50. Id.
51. See id.; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
290 (1983); Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274; Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958); Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379 (1910).
52. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 999–1000.
56. Id. at 1000 (quoting Rummel, 445 U.S. at 274–75).
57. Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 289–90).
58. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 288).
59. Id.
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Bearing in mind those central principles, Justice Kennedy applied a two
part test to examine whether, as Harmelin challenged, the Michigan
Legislature violated the Eighth Amendment by passing a sentence that was
cruel and unusual either because of its gross disproportionality or mandatory
nature.60 Justice Kennedy concluded that in neither respect was there a
constitutional violation.61 In part one of the test, he explained that the Court
must make a threshold determination of whether or not the sentence is grossly
disproportionate based on the severity of the punishment and the severity of
the crime.62 If a sentence is found to be grossly disproportionate, the Court
should then consider the sentencing practices of other jurisdictions for the
same crime or sentences attendant other crimes within the same jurisdiction.63
Such a comparison is employed only in the case of a threshold finding of gross
disproportionality.64
Justice Kennedy explained that his principles one through four inform and
support principle five.65 A careful examination of the five principles reveals
that they are indeed related, and we would add to Justice Kennedy’s comment
that principles two through five all arise out of the first principle: that the
fixing of criminal penalties is “properly within the province of legislatures, not
courts.”66 Indeed, we identify this principle of strong deference to legislatures
in the question of criminal sentencing policy as the controlling principle in the
Court’s case-by-case Eighth Amendment analysis of proportionality. Each of
Justice Kennedy’s other principles is derivative or supportive of the principle
of legislative deference: there is no constitutional preference among policies,
which leaves the choice to the legislature and requires courts to defer to that
choice; there will be variation in policies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
because different legislatures will make different choices, to which courts will
defer; the lack of objective factors by which courts could judge proportionality
makes successful challenges “exceedingly rare,” leaving intact the decision of
the legislature; and courts applying the Eighth Amendment will defer to
legislation, which allows widely disparate sentences, forbidding only those
sentences that are grossly disproportionate.
Harmelin’s sentence did not pass the threshold finding of gross
disproportionality.67 While Harmelin’s sentence was the same as that received

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1009.
62. Id. at 1005.
63. Id.
64. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
65. Id. at 1001.
66. Id. at 998 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275–76 (1980)).
67. Id. at 1005.
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in Solem v. Helm, in which a life sentence without parole was struck down,68
and indeed is the second most severe sentence that could be imposed on an
individual, the Court found it permissible in this case because of the severity of
Harmelin’s offense.69 The Court distinguished the facts of Solem, finding that
Solem merely wrote a bad check, “one of the most passive felonies a person
could commit,” whereas Harmelin was found to be in possession of nearly 650
grams of a controlled and dangerous substance.70 The Court noted:
From any standpoint, this crime falls in a different category from the relatively
minor, nonviolent crime at issue in Solem. Possession, use, and distribution of
illegal drugs represents “one of the greatest problems affecting the health and
welfare of our population.” . . . To the contrary, petitioner’s crime threatened
71
to cause grave harm to society.

Therefore, the Court found that “the Michigan Legislature could with
reason conclude that the threat posed to the individual and society by
possession of this large an amount of cocaine—in terms of violence, crime,
and social displacement—is momentous enough to warrant the deterrence and
retribution of a life sentence without parole.”72 The Court itself did not find
that the sentence was proportional, but rather that there were reasonable
grounds for the Michigan Legislature to conclude that it was.73
Justice Kennedy next dismissed Harmelin’s challenge to the mandatory
nature of the sentence.74 He concluded that mandatory sentences do not violate
the Eighth Amendment because “[i]t is beyond question that the legislature
‘has the power to define criminal punishments without giving the courts any
sentencing discretion.’”75 He again distinguished Solem on the grounds that
the life without parole sentence in that case was the maximum possible
sentence allowable, not the mandatory sentence imposed.76
Since Harmelin, the Court has considered the issue of excessive term of
years sentencing three times: in Ewing v. California77 and Lockyer v.
Andrade78 in 2003, and in Graham v. Florida in 2010,79 discussed earlier.

68. 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
69. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
70. Id. at 1002 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983)).
71. Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989)).
72. Id. at 1003.
73. Id. at 1004.
74. Id. at 1006.
75. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991)).
76. Id.
77. 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
78. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
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Ewing and Andrade were decided the same day, both challenging the
California three strikes law.80 In Ewing, the Court found constitutional a
sentence of 25 years to life for the theft of three golf clubs.81 In Andrade, the
Court upheld a sentence of two back-to-back sentences of 25 years for two
counts of petty theft.82 Both decisions were heavily guided Justice Kennedy’s
“guiding principles” from Harmelin, specifically with regard to legislative
deference. The Ewing Court expressly upheld the application of California’s
three-strike law to Ewing’s case because “legislatures enacting three strikes
laws made a deliberate policy choice” and “[t]hough three strikes laws may be
relatively new, our tradition of deferring to state legislatures in making and
implementing such important policy decisions is longstanding.”83 In Andrade,
the Court refused to grant Mr. Andrade’s petition for habeas corpus review of
his sentence based on the unconstitutionality of the three-strikes law because
“the governing legal principle [of the cruel and unusual punishment clause]
gives legislatures broad discretion to fashion a sentence that fits within the
scope of the proportionality principle.”84
B.

Categorically Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Deference to legislative enactments also plays a central, but less
determinative role in the Court’s analysis of categorically cruel and unusual
sentences. “The analysis begins,” the Court has repeatedly held, “with
objective indicia of national consensus.”85 The Court recognizes that the
“clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the
legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”86 Legislative enactments, as
evidence of societal values, are the principal starting place for the Court’s
categorical analysis, but the Court will also bring its own judgments to bear on
a particular sentence and consider the specific factors: the moral culpability of
an offender, such as the type of crime committed or the characteristics of the
offender; the penological justifications of a particular sentence; and
international consensus.87 The Court has noted that “[i]n accordance with the

79. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). Graham was ultimately decided as a categorical challenge to the
constitutionality of imposing a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile. Id. at 2034.
80. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11, 14 (plurality opinion); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 63, 66.
81. 538 U.S. at 30–31 (plurality opinion).
82. 538 U.S. at 77.
83. 538 U.S. at 24–25 (plurality opinion) (citing a string of cases emphasizing the
importance of deference).
84. 538 U.S. at 76 (“And it was not objectively unreasonable for the California Court of
Appeal to conclude that these ‘contours’ permitted an affirmance of Andrade’s sentence.”).
85. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010).
86. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)).
87. See id. at 2033; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
317–18; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988) (plurality opinion); Enmund v.
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constitutional design, ‘the task of interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains
our responsibility.’”88
When the Court considers the proportionality of a particular category of
sentencing practice, it begins by taking a poll of state legislative enactments.89
When a majority of legislatures uphold a certain practice, the Court will
generally uphold the practice as well; when only a minority of legislature
support a practice, the Court will generally strike it down.90 Rarely has the
Court strayed from this time-tested deference to legislative enactments. In
1989, it upheld the practice of executing the mentally handicapped when a
majority of jurisdictions did not ban the practice.91 Thirteen years later,
however, the Court changed its position on the issue because the national
consensus had changed.92 Justice Stevens began the opinion in Atkins v.
Virginia, which struck down the practice, by noting that “[b]ecause of their
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses . . .
[the mentally retarded] do not act with the level of moral culpability that
characterizes the most serious adult criminal conduct.”93 He then surmised the
following:
Presumably for these reasons, in the 13 years since we decided Penry v.
Lynaugh, the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges have
deliberated over the question whether the death penalty should ever be
imposed on a mentally retarded criminal. The consensus reflected in those
deliberations informs our answer to the question presented by this case:
whether such executions are “cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited by
94
the Eighth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

In order to test for such a consensus, Justice Stevens then took stock of the
number of state legislatures and federal laws that forbade the execution of the
mentally retarded and found that in fact a majority of States had passed
legislation forbidding the practice.95 He commented on the importance of the
legislative enactments to the Court’s decision:

Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796–97 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (plurality opinion).
88. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 575).
89. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
90. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
91. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334 (1989) (“In our view, the two state statutes
prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the 14 States that have
rejected capital punishment completely, do not provide sufficient evidence at present of a national
consensus.”), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
92. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–16.
93. Id. at 306.
94. Id. at 307 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 314–16.
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It is not so much the number of these States that is significant, but the
consistency of the direction of change. Given the well-known fact that
anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation providing protections
for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides
powerful evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as
96
categorically less culpable than the average criminal.

Similarly, in 1989 the Court upheld capital punishment for juvenile
offenders because “a majority of the States that permit capital punishment
authorize it for crimes committed at age 16 or above”97 but rejected it in 2005
when they found that “30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty, comprising
12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but,
by express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its
reach.”98
In the rare circumstances where the Court has chosen not to follow
legislative trends and has overturned a particular practice though a majority of
legislatures still approved it, it has made a point of showing that the sentencing
practice had grown lifeless. For example, in Graham, the Court overturned the
practice of sentencing juvenile non-homicide offenders to life in prison without
parole even though a majority of states still had valid legislation approving the
practice.99 The Graham Court concluded, however, that the sentencing
practice in question was used in those jurisdictions infrequently, if at all.100
Thus, the legislation no longer represented the will of the people.101 Though
not explicitly mentioned in Graham, the Court’s recognition in Atkins that
legislatures are much more likely to pass laws that further punish criminals as
opposed to ones that provide for more lenient treatment undoubtedly played a
role in the Court’s conclusion that inactive legislation was not the strongest
evidence of national consensus.102 Thus, the Court’s deference to recently
passed, pro-active legislation is strongest, whereas dated legislation that is no
longer actively employed still serves as a starting place but will perhaps

96. Id. at 315–16 (footnote omitted).
97. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 371 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005).
98. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
99. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–26, 2034 app. (2010).
100. Id. at 2025 (“Although it is not certain how many of these numerous juvenile offenders
were eligible for life without parole sentences, the comparison suggests that in proportion to the
opportunities for its imposition, life without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of
nonhomicide crimes is as rare as other sentencing practices found to be cruel and unusual.”).
101. Id.
102. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315–16 (2002).
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receive less deference as an indication of national consensus on a particular
issue.
As we have discussed, in assessing the proportionality of either an
individual sentence or a particular sentencing scheme, legislative deference is a
central principle. The Court defers to the legislature’s expertise in policymaking and judgments in fixing the appropriate number of years of
incarceration. The Court further defers to legislatures’ role as representatives
of the people in imposing a particular sentencing scheme on a class of
offenders. The Court assumes that legislators have considered the various
penological goals of a punishment and agreed that the approved sentence is
appropriate for either rehabilitating, incapacitating, imposing proper
retribution, or properly deterring future criminal acts.103
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND DEPORTATION AS PUNISHMENT
A.

A Hundred Years of “Civil” Sanction: The Supreme Court and Its
Challengers

The Supreme Court has thus far refused to consider, in any substantive
way, to what extent the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause could act as a limit on deportation proceedings. For over one hundred
years, any Eighth Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of deportation
has been summarily dismissed on the grounds that deportation is “purely civil”
in nature and the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal punishment.104
In 1893, in the case of Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that proceedings to expel a noncitizen were civil rather than criminal in nature,
and that many of the constitutional protections that applied to criminal
defendants and criminal proceedings—including the Eighth Amendment—
were therefore not applicable to deportation.105 The Court held that:
[D]eportation is not a punishment for crime. . . . It is but a method of enforcing
the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the
conditions upon the performance of which the government of the nation . . .
has determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. . . . [T]he
provisions of the Constitution . . . prohibiting . . . cruel and unusual
106
punishments, have no application.

Though Fong Yue Ting did not involve deportation related to criminal
behavior (as no such provisions existed at that time), its principle that

103. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30.
104. See, e.g., Bassett v. INS, 581 F.2d 1385, 1387–1388 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing a string of
cases rejecting the Eighth Amendment challenge to deportation and noting that “every other
appellate court facing the issue has rejected its application to [deportation] proceedings”).
105. 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
106. Id.
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deportation proceedings are purely civil in nature was relied on by the
Supreme Court for over a century to summarily dismiss claims that the Eighth
Amendment and other constitutional protections due to criminal defendants
should apply in deportation proceedings.107 Though the Court did not again
directly address the applicability of the Eighth Amendment to deportation, it
consistently and summarily refused to allow other criminal-style constitutional
protections, in most cases simply stating that the proceedings were civil and
citing Fong Yue Ting and its progeny. For example, over the course of the
century, the Court relied on Fong Yue Ting to dismiss claims based on the Ex
Post Facto Clause,108 the Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination,109 and the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
search and seizure.110
It is important to note, however, that there has been a consistent
counterpoint to this chorus of reliance on Fong Yue Ting’s civil versus criminal
distinction to deny constitutional protections, beginning with the powerful
dissents of Justices Brewer, Field, and Fuller in Fong Yue Ting itself.111 All
three Justices, referring to the severe hardships imposed by deportation, would
have held that deportation was punishment and merited the constitutional
protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Amendments.112 In the
words of Justice Brewer:

107. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1908–09 (2000) (discussing
the important conceptual distinction between deportability grounds based on principles of
extended border control and on post-entry conduct).
108. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) (refusing to apply the prohibition on
ex post facto laws to a deportation law because it held that deportation was not a punishment for
crime). In 1952, the Court again refused to find that the Ex Post Facto Clause had been violated
and upheld the deportation of a noncitizen who had become a member of the Communist Party on
the grounds that “[t]he inhibition against the passage of an ex post facto law by Congress . . .
applies only to criminal laws . . . and not to a deportation act like this.” Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 595 (1952) (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924)).
109. See Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923) (refusing to apply the Fifth
Amendment protection against self-incrimination in deportation because the proceeding was “not
a criminal one”).
110. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures does not ordinarily justify the
suppression of evidence in deportation proceedings, referencing Fong Yue Ting and simply
stating that “[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action” and that “[c]onsistent with the
civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do
not apply in a deportation hearing”); see also Pauw, supra note 15, at 308 n.9 (citing like
treatment by lower courts).
111. 149 U.S. at 732 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761
(Fuller, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 740–41 (Brewer, J., dissenting); id. at 748–49 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 763
(Fuller, J., dissenting).
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But it needs no citation of authorities to support the proposition that
deportation is punishment. Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away
from home, and family, and friends, and business, and property, and sent
across the ocean to a distant land, is punishment, and that oftentimes most
113
severe and cruel.

Interestingly, in addition to recognizing the hardships caused by
deportation, the dissenters relied strongly on the fact that the noncitizens
before the Court were legally present in the country,114 a point that mirrors the
circumstances of the many lawful permanent residents currently facing
deportation for crimes. On the question of the proportionality of the sanction
in the context of the Eighth Amendment, Justice Field stated:
The punishment is beyond all reason in its severity. It is out of all
proportion to the alleged offense. It is cruel and unusual. As to its cruelty,
nothing can exceed a forcible deportation from a country of one’s residence,
and the breaking up of all the relations of friendship, family, and business there
115
contracted.

The passionate dissents from Fong Yue Ting have echoed through the
subsequent century in the voices of a steady stream of dissenting Justices,
some of whom have maintained that deportation is punishment and therefore
should have all the protections attendant the imposition of criminal punishment
and some of whom have taken the position that constitutional protections are
the responsibility of the government where important liberty interests are at
stake, regardless of whether a proceeding is civil or criminal.116 For example,
the various dissenters in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza all took the position that the
civil nature of deportation proceedings was no reason not to apply the Fourth
Amendment in full force, because the government’s agents had the same
113. Id. at 740 (Brewer, J., dissenting). Justice Brewer goes on to quote James Madison on
the banishment of aliens:
If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited as the asylum
most auspicious to his happiness—a country where he may have formed the most tender
connections, where he may have invested his entire property, and acquired property of the
real and permanent, as well as the movable and temporary kind, where he enjoys, under
the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal security and personal liberty than he
can elsewhere hope for, if, moreover, in the execution of the sentence against him he is to
be exposed, not only to the ordinary dangers of the sea, but to the peculiar casualties
incident to a crisis of war and of unusual licentiousness on that element, and possibly to
vindictive purposes, which his immigration itself may have provoked—if a banishment of
this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult
to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.
Id. at 740–41 (quoting James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4
ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 555 (1836)).
114. Id. at 754 (Field, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 759.
116. See Pauw, supra note 15, at 308 n.8 (detailing these dissenting opinions).
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obligation to respect an individual’s right to be free of unreasonable search and
seizure, regardless of whether they were investigating crime or civil
immigration violations.117 In his dissent in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Justice
Douglas took a position in support of constitutional protections for those facing
deportation because of the important liberty interests at stake:
Unless [resident aliens] are free from arbitrary banishment, the “liberty” they
enjoy while they live here is indeed illusory. Banishment is punishment in the
practical sense. It may deprive a man and his family of all that makes life
worth while. Those who have their roots here have an important stake in this
118
country.

In addition, a lively scholarly conversation has repeatedly questioned the
Court’s characterization of deportation as purely civil and the appropriateness
of foregoing constitutional protections on that basis.119 Nonetheless, the
dominant and controlling case law of the Court has consistently held that
constitutional protections due to criminal defendants generally are not
applicable in deportation proceedings strictly because those proceedings are
civil.120 Only a handful of scholars have directly addressed criminal

117. E.g., 468 U.S. 1032, 1052 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Government of the
United States bears an obligation to obey the Fourth Amendment; that obligation is not lifted
simply because the law enforcement officers were agents of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, nor because the evidence obtained by those officers was to be used in civil deportation
proceedings.”).
118. 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
119. See Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the British
Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 115,
116 (1999); Austin T. Fragomen, Jr., The “Uncivil” Nature of Deportation: Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Rights and the Exclusionary Rule, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 29, 34–35 (1978); Kanstroom,
supra note 107, at 1893–94; Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007);
Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
289, 316–20 (2008); Lisa Mendel, Note, The Court’s Failure to Recognize Deportation as
Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 205,
216–17 (2000); Pauw, supra note 15, at 313; Michelle Rae Pinzon, Note, Was the Supreme Court
Right? A Closer Look at the True Nature of Removal Proceedings in the 21st Century, 16 N.Y.
INT’L L. REV. 29, 32 (2003); Gregory L. Ryan, Distinguishing Fong Yue Ting: Why the Inclusion
of Perjury as an Aggravated Felony Subjecting Legal Aliens to Deportation Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act Violates the Eighth Amendment, 28 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 989, 1010–13 (1997); Lupe S. Salinas, Note, Deportations, Removals and the 1996
Immigration Acts: A Modern Look at the Ex Post Facto Clause, 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 245, 261–72
(2004); Ethan Venner Torrey, “The Dignity of Crimes”: Judicial Removal of Aliens and the
Civil-Criminal Distinction, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187, 188, 206 (1999); Immigration
Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1386 (1983).
120. E.g., Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038; Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 594–95.
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deportation as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.121
The wealth of supporting scholarly research on the civil versus criminal nature
of deportation and the relative lack of attention to the Eighth Amendment as a
tool to challenge disproportionate deportation make this an area ripe for
examination, made even more so by the Supreme Court’s recent precedentbending decisions in Padilla and Graham.
B.

The Immigration Consequences for Crime

When discussing the relationships and interactions between criminal and
immigration law, it is important to recognize two things. One is that the lives
of tens of thousands of our country’s citizens and residents—noncitizen
defendants and their family members, many of whom are U.S. citizens—are
completely and irrevocably upended each year by the deportation of lawful
residents for relatively minor criminal convictions.122 The other is that the
structure and operation of our immigration laws with regard to those who
commit criminal offenses is by no means intuitively logical, fair, or even
consistent with the way our criminal law treats those same individuals. In fact,
quite the opposite is often true. For example, a criminal sentencing judge will
take into account the circumstances of a particular case and may completely
suspend the sentence of an individual for a first-time theft offense. That
individual, though she spends no time at all in jail on the theft charge, may
nonetheless find herself categorized as an “aggravated felon” under
immigration laws.123 As such, she will be subject to mandatory detention and
face automatic deportation solely because of the misdemeanor theft charge,
regardless of how long she has been a permanent resident or how deep her ties
are in the United States. Because such outcomes are so counter-intuitive—and
so common—it is important to ground any discussion of criminal deportation
in a basic understanding of how immigration law actually operates in the face
121. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 18, at 1662; Ryan, supra note 119, at 1035–37. See also the
writings of Third Circuit Judge H. Lee Sarokin, who has long “rail[ed] against” the unjust
practice of deporting long-time residents with ties to the country for minor crimes. H. Lee
Sarokin, When Does Deportation Become Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 31, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judge-h-lee-sarokin/when-does-depor
tation-bec_b_520972.html; H. Lee Sarokin, Debunking the Myth that Deportation Is not
Punishment, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2009, 4:44 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
judge-h-lee-sarokin/debunking-the-myth-that-d_b_321329.html.
122. See UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW & UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS SCH. OF LAW, IN
THE CHILD’S BEST INTEREST? THE CONSEQUENCES OF LOSING A LAWFUL IMMIGRANT PARENT
TO DEPORTATION 3–4 (2010), available at http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/news/images/childsbestin
terest.pdf; Michael Falcone, 100,000 Parents of Citizens Were Deported over 10 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A16.
123. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2006) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”). Deportation consequences thus often result
from the offense’s classification as an “aggravated felony”.
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of criminal convictions. Justice Stevens did just this in the Padilla decision,
first tracing the history and operation of the immigration law of convictions in
order to ground the decision’s analysis and conclusions in that reality.124
Removal is imposed under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(hereinafter “INA”) as a sanction for an extremely wide range of criminal
offenses, including serious crimes,125 but also a number of lesser offenses.126
The consequences of these offenses depend on which category the offense falls
within, as those categories are defined by the INA. The most widely
prosecuted categories of offenses are drug offenses127 and those identified as
“crimes involving moral turpitude”128 and “aggravated felonies”.129 Each of
these categories, in turn, includes a broad range of offenses.
With regard to drug offenses, the INA provides that an individual is
removable if convicted of any offense “relating to a controlled substance.”130
This provision has been interpreted broadly to include any drug offense from
simple possession to offenses relating to drug kingpins.131 It also includes
simple possession of drug paraphernalia.132
The category of crimes involving moral turpitude is not defined by the
INA, but it has been defined in the case law as any crime involving conduct
that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of
morality” or “intrinsically wrong.”133 This category has been found to include
everything from fairly standard “crimes involving moral turpitude,” such as
crimes committed with an intent to do bodily harm, sex offenses, and drug
124. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478–80 (2010).
125. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A) (murder); id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (aggravated assault); id. §
1227(a)(2)(C) (firearm offenses); id. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (domestic violence); id. § 1101(a)(43)(B)
(drug trafficking).
126. E.g., id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv) (high speed flight); id. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (theft); id. §
1101(a)(43)(M) (fraud); id. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (possession of drug paraphernalia); id. §
1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (child neglect or abuse); id. § 1101(a)(43)(P) (document fraud); id. §
1101(a)(43)(S) (perjury); id. § 1101(a)(43)(Q) (failure to appear for a criminal trial).
127. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
128. Id. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
129. Id. § 1101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felonies with deportation consequences under §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
130. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(B).
131. See In re Hernandez-Ponce, 19 I. & N. Dec. 613, 616 (B.I.A. 1988) (“It is evident to
us . . . that Congress intended to expand rather than limit the power of the Government to curtail
drug abuse through the immigration laws. . . . In the case before us, the respondent has admitted
to being twice convicted for the crime of use and being under the influence of phencyclidine.
Phencyclidine is listed as a controlled substance . . . . [T]he respondent falls within the purview of
the amended language . . . of the Act, which refers to convictions ‘relating to a controlled
substance.’” (citation omitted)).
132. See Luu-Le v. INS, 224 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2000).
133. In re Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (B.I.A. 1994), aff’d, 72 F.3d 571 (8th. Cir.
1995).
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trafficking, to less serious offenses, like writing bad checks,134 bootlegging,135
petty theft,136 student loan fraud,137 making false statements,138 and misuse of a
Social Security card.139 An individual, even if she is a permanent resident, can
be removable for a crime involving moral turpitude if it is committed within
five years of her admission to the United States140 or if she is convicted of two
such crimes, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal conduct, at any
time.141
Depending on her underlying immigration status and how long she has
held that status, a person who is removable for simple possession of a
controlled substance or a crime involving moral turpitude may or may not
qualify for some form of relief from deportation, such as cancellation of
removal for lawful permanent residents.142 This possible eligibility for relief
from removal applies also to permanent residents convicted of other removable
offenses, such as domestic violence offenses143 or illegal firearms
possession.144
However, since 1996, these categories of offenses for which relief from
deportation is available have been largely eclipsed by the greatly expanded
category of “aggravated felonies,”145 which render an individual automatically
removable146 and disqualify her from eligibility for cancellation of removal147
and virtually every other form of relief available in immigration
proceedings.148 In addition to automatic deportation, someone deported for an

134. Ijoma v. INS, 875 F. Supp. 625, 630 (D. Neb. 1995), aff’d, 76 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1996);
Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 91–92 (9th Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Portada v. Day, 16 F.2d
328, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); In re Logan, 17 I. & N. Dec. 367, 368 (B.I.A. 1980).
135. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951); Maita v. Haff, 116 F.2d 337, 337 (9th
Cir. 1940).
136. Castillo-Cruz v. Holder, 581 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2009).
137. Kabongo v. INS, 837 F.2d 753, 758 (6th Cir. 1988).
138. Zaitona v. INS, 9 F.3d 432, 437–38 (6th Cir. 1993).
139. Serrato-Soto v. Holder, 570 F.3d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 2009); Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d
388, 393 (5th Cir. 2007).
140. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
141. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
142. Id. § 1229b(a) (permitting cancellation of removal to aliens with no aggravated felonies
who are legal permanent residents of the United States for a minimum of five years or who have
continuously resided in the United States in a lawful presence for seven years).
143. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
144. Id. § 1227(a)(2)(C).
145. Id. § 1101(a)(43).
146. 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c) (“Any alien convicted of an aggravated felony shall be conclusively
presumed to be deportable from the United States.” (emphasis added)).
147. Id. § 1101(f)(8); id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B).
148. Id. § 1229b(a)(3). Individuals with these convictions are specifically barred from
seeking relief, such as cancellation of removal for individuals who are not legal permanent
residents, id. § 1229b(b)(1), special cancellation of removal for Central Americans under the
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aggravated felony conviction is permanently barred from reentering the
country,149 which makes removal for an aggravated felony a kind of life
banishment without the possibility of parole. This most severe of all
immigration sanctions might indeed be appropriate for the most serious
criminal offenses and for those noncitizens with few community ties, but the
current legal framework makes the sanction automatic for a stunningly broad
range of offenses—some relatively quite minor—and takes no account of the
individual’s underlying immigration status or ties to the United States. As a
result, there is no distinction between the sanction automatically imposed on
someone who entered the country very recently and illegally and that imposed
on a long term permanent resident with U.S citizen children and significant
history in and ties to the community. Likewise, there is no distinction between
the sanction for someone convicted of murder and someone convicted of
failing to appear in court to answer a criminal charge that carries a potential
two year sentence.150 Both are equally subject to the full weight of automatic
and permanent deportation that falls on the aggravated felony category. Other
offenses that can be categorized as aggravated felonies include receipt of stolen
property, petty theft, simple assault, possession with intent to distribute a
controlled substance, second degree burglary, accessory after the fact, and
perjury, as well as attempts or conspiracies to commit any of these offenses.151

Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.66 (2011), voluntary
departure, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1), relief under the battered spouse provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.65(d)(3), and, in most cases, temporary protected status, id.
§ 1244.4. They are even barred from humanitarian relief from persecution in the form of asylum,
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i), and in many circumstances where removal would threaten the safety
of the alien, the more limited withholding of removal as well, id. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). The only
possible relief remaining for someone convicted of an aggravated felony requires her to
demonstrate that her “life or freedom would be threatened,” id. § 1231(b)(3)(C), or that her
government would subject her to torture if she were deported, 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16–18. See
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. Obviously, very few individuals facing
removal can meet these standards.
149. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(A) permanently prohibits admission to the
United States for any alien who has been ordered deported at the end of removal proceedings and
has been convicted of an aggravated felony. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).
150. Both offenses are defined as an aggravated felony within the meaning of immigration
law. Id. §§ 1011(a)(43)(A), 1101(a)(43)(T).
151. Id. § 1101(a)(43) (2006) (defining aggravated felonies). Some of these offenses, such as
theft, burglary, and crimes of violence, are classified as aggravated felonies when the conviction
is accompanied by a sentence of one year or more. Id. §§ 1101(a)(43)(F), 1101(a)(43)(G). This
includes any sentence that may have been suspended by the criminal court, another factor that
makes immigration consequences counterintuitive for those accustomed to the criminal justice
system. Id. § 1101(a)(48)(B). For an overview of many convictions categorized as aggravated
felonies and convictions that fall into other removable categories, see MAUREEN A. SWEENEY ET
AL., ABBREVIATED CHART FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTITIONERS OF THE IMMIGRATION
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Because of the broad reach of the aggravated felony category and the severe
and automatic nature of its consequences, many criminal convictions, which
may not seem like “serious” offenses to those in the criminal justice system,
lead automatically to deportation for permanent residents and other
noncitizens.152
C. Deportation as Punishment in Padilla v. Kentucky
When understood in the context of the hundred-year-long debate over
whether deportation can constitute punishment and the current severity and
inflexibility of deportation for crimes, Padilla’s statement that “as a matter of
federal law, deportation is an integral part . . . of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes” is
indeed profound.153 While Justice Stevens was careful to acknowledge that
deportation is in fact still “civil in nature,” such a statement rings hollow in
light of the Court’s extended discussion of the extent to which criminal
convictions and deportation have become “intimately related” and
“enmeshed.”154 In Parts I and II of the Padilla opinion, Justice Stevens posited
that deportation is different today than it was when the civil versus criminal
distinction was first made and it is uniquely different from a host of other
“collateral” consequences for which criminal procedural protections are
excluded.155
Justice Stevens begins Part I of the opinion by stating, “[t]he landscape of
federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the past 90 years.”156
This change, he explained, has taken the United States from a time of
“unimpeded immigration” to one where the “‘drastic measure’ of deportation
or removal is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens
convicted of crimes.”157 In the era of Fong Yue Ting there was no such thing
as a post-entry ground of deportability.158 One could only be denied entry into
the United States for demonstrating some reprehensible characteristic; the
government did not regulate behavior after an immigrant was allowed to
enter.159

CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS UNDER MARYLAND STATE LAW (2011), available
at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/Msweeney/ImmigrationConsequencesChart.pdf.
152. For a more in-depth history of the expansion of the aggravated felony and other criminal
deportation provisions, see Maureen A. Sweeney, Fact or Fiction: The Legal Construction of
Immigration Removal for Crimes, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 47, 63–67 (2010).
153. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010) (footnote omitted).
154. Id. at 1481.
155. Id. at 1478–82.
156. Id. at 1478.
157. Id. (citations omitted).
158. See Kanstroom, supra note 107, at 1901.
159. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
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Justice Stevens explained that the concept of deportation based on postentry behavior was first introduced with the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1917.160 The Act made deportable certain aliens who committed a crime
involving moral turpitude.161 The Act, however, “also included a critically
important procedural protection to minimize the risk of unjust deportation”—
The Judicial Recommendation Against Deportation, also referred to as
JRAD.162 Rather than being a mere recommendation, however, the JRAD
“had the effect of binding the Executive to prevent deportation; the statute was
‘consistently . . . interpreted as giving the sentencing judge conclusive
authority to decide whether a particular conviction should be disregarded as a
basis for deportation.’”163 Therefore, even though the classes of deportable
aliens continued to expand, sentencing judges retained the right to “ameliorate
unjust results on a case-by-case basis.”164
Justice Stevens wrapped up Part I by explaining that sentencing judges no
longer have that right to recommend against deportation; Congress eliminated
that right completely in 1990, and later eliminated the Attorney General’s right
to grant discretionary relief from deportation for anyone with an aggravated
felony conviction.165 The result is that deportation is now an entirely
automatic consequence for many crimes. Thus, he concludes, “[t]hese changes
confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral
part—indeed, sometimes the most important part—of the penalty that may be
imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.”166
In Part II of the Padilla opinion, Justice Stevens explained why deportation
as a consequence of a crime is within the ambit of Strickland v. Washington’s
requirement that criminal counsel be competent.167 The Kentucky Supreme
Court, following numerous other courts, had held that a defense counsel’s
failure to advise a defendant of a possible consequence of deportation cannot
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because immigration is a collateral
rather than direct consequence of a crime, and therefore Strickland does not
apply.168 Justice Stevens reversed the Kentucky decision, pointing out that

160. See id. at 1479.
161. Id. Deportability for crimes involving moral turpitude was the same in 1917 as it is
today: Anyone who commits such an offense within five years of entry and receives a sentence of
one year or more is deportable, as is anyone who commits two or more such crimes at any time
after admission. Compare id. (describing original deportability framework under the Immigration
and Nationality Act of1917), with 8 U.S.C §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006).
162. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1479.
163. Id. (quoting Janvier v. United States, 793 F.2d 449, 452 (2d Cir. 1986)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1480.
166. Id. (footnote omitted).
167. Id. at 1481–82.
168. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481.
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because of the changes to the nature of deportation referenced in Part I, the
direct versus collateral distinction was “ill-suited” to deportation:
Although removal proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless
intimately related to the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a century. And,
importantly, recent changes in our immigration law have made removal nearly
an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it
“most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation
169
context.

Justice Stevens further observed that the Court has never held that the
direct/collateral distinction was relevant to the scope of Strickland’s
requirements.170 Thus, he concluded that “advice regarding deportation is not
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”171 Justice Stevens concluded
the opinion of the Court by holding that Mr. Padilla’s counsel did fail to give
effective assistance, not only in that he affirmatively misadvised Mr. Padilla
but also to the extent that he failed to offer advice.172 Justice Stevens
remanded the case for consideration as to whether Mr. Padilla was prejudiced
by the ineffective assistance of counsel, the second prong of the Strickland
analysis.173
Taking Justice Stevens at his word that deportation is indeed part of a
criminal penalty and that punishment is indeed at times “harsh” and “severe,”
we turn now to examine whether the Court’s established Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence might support the position that certain cases of criminal
deportation may be disproportionate and amount to cruel and unusual
punishment.
III. DISPROPORTIONATE DEPORTATION AS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
Our review of the jurisprudence of both categorical and individual Eighth
Amendment challenges to sentencing demonstrates that the Court gives
extremely broad deference to legislative determinations of what sentences are
appropriate and proportionate. It is clear from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
in Harmelin and the Court’s subsequent cases that the Court considers the
power to determine sentences or sentencing ranges a proper exercise of the
legislature’s policy-making function to which the Court will give great
deference.174 Justice Kennedy began his explication of the principles guiding
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1482.
Id. at 1486–87.
Id. at 1487.
See supra Part I.A.
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proportionality review with the “first” principle, that of legislative
deference.175 Indeed, as we have seen, all of his five principles are grounded in
or lead to strong deference to the legislative prerogative and expertise in
policymaking.176 He goes on to affirm that responsibility for making
sentencing policy judgments lies squarely with the legislature, noting,
“[w]hatever views may be entertained regarding severity of punishment,
whether one believes in its efficacy or its futility, . . . these are peculiarly
questions of legislative policy.”177 It is not for a reviewing court to secondguess the wisdom of the legislature’s considered judgment in these complex
questions of the types and limits of punishment for crimes.178 It is for precisely
this reason that the Eighth Amendment does not require strict congruence
between crime and sentence, despite its guiding precept of proportionality,179
but rather “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’
to the crime.”180
There can be no doubt that the Court has indeed deferred substantially to
legislatures in its review of sentencing schemes, a deference that has to a large
extent eviscerated the Eighth Amendment’s ability to support challenges to the
proportionality of individual criminal sentences. Of most direct relevance for
our purposes are the cases addressing state “three-strike” laws and mandatory
minimums, sentences that are applied automatically based on the offense and
the individual’s criminal history, without regard to discretionary factors
relating to the actual conduct of the individual offender.181 The majority in
Harmelin specifically upheld the legislature’s power to impose mandatory
sentences and rejected an argument that individual (non-death) sentences had
to be individualized according to the trial court’s determination of whether the
punishment was appropriate to the case.182 It is furthermore clear in Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence that the Court’s deference to the severe, mandatory
penalty was based on the premise that the legislature, the body best suited to
making policy determinations, had already considered and made the

175. Michigan v. Harmelin, 501 U.S. 957, 998–99 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998–99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
178. See id. at 999.
179. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366–67 (1910).
180. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,
271 (1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Weems, 217 U.S. at
371.
181. See discussion supra notes 77–84 and accompanying text.
182. 501 U.S. at 996 (“We have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at
capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further.”).
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“substantive penological judgment” that the sentence was supported by the
genuine, reasonable penological concerns of retribution and deterrence.183 In
three-strikes cases, the Court has deferred to the legislature’s judgment that the
threat of recidivism justified the goals of deterring and incapacitating repeat
offenders through increased sentences and refused to sit as a “superlegislature”
to revisit that judgment.184 As we have seen, this deference has led to the
upholding of sentences that are severe indeed in light of the actual
circumstances of the offenses.
In categorical proportionality challenges, deference to the legislature has
been somewhat more muted than in term-of-years challenges, as the Court sees
a stronger role for itself in judging the appropriateness of the uniquely severe
and irrevocable sanction of death and, more recently, life without parole for
juveniles. However, it is clear that the existence of legislation is a powerful
factor in the Court’s assessment of whether there is a national consensus in
favor of or opposed to a particular punishment, and the Court finds evidence of
such policy-based legislative decision-making to be the most reliable objective
evidence of national values, and thus the starting point for its analysis.185
However, in order for either of these manifestations of legislative
deference to make sense as a key determinant of proportionality analysis, there
must be evidence that the legislature has indeed made a substantive
penological judgment as to the appropriateness of a sentence or sentencing
scheme. While he made clear that it was not the role of the judiciary to
second-guess the legislature’s judgment, Justice Kennedy in Harmelin also
clearly understood that such substantive consideration and judgment was
essential at some point: “The efficacy of any sentencing system cannot be
assessed absent agreement on the purposes and objectives of the penal
system.”186 In other words, it is clear that there must be at least some
reasonable penological rationale for a sentencing system, and that someone
must have articulated this and made a judgment as to its efficacy. While the
Court has often refused to engage in a re-evaluation of a system’s efficacy, it
has refused to do so precisely because the legislature has already done an
initial evaluation of the relationship between the scheme and genuine
penological goals.
Likewise, in its categorical analysis in Graham, the Court made clear that
the simple fact that a sentencing law is on the books does not mean that the
legislature has necessarily fully considered its penological merits and,

183. Id. at 998, 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[T]he
Michigan Legislature could with reason conclude that the threat posed . . . is momentous enough
to warrant the deterrence and retribution of a life sentence without parole.” (emphasis added)).
184. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (plurality opinion).
185. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2022–23 (2010).
186. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
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importantly, that the deference due such laws depends upon this
consideration.187 In its review of state laws which allow a life sentence
without parole for juveniles, the Court speculated that the states that authorize
the transfer of juveniles to adult court may not have realized or intended for
those juveniles to be exposed to the imposition of a life sentence without
parole.188 The Court concluded that the simple fact that a sentencing law or
practice exists “does not indicate that the penalty has been endorsed through
deliberate, express, and full legislative consideration.”189 Without that
endorsement, the Court was unwilling to defer to such statutory schemes,
despite the fact that they were on the books in thirty-seven states.190
Herein lies a fundamental problem with the INA’s scheme of deportation
for crimes: that it operates, yet has never been evaluated by Congress or the
judiciary, as a sentencing scheme. Padilla recognized the imposition of
deportation for criminal conduct as part of the penalty for the commission of a
crime, but it was not considered to be so when Congress passed the various
provisions that make up the criminal deportation scheme. Rather, it was
passed as part of the nation’s immigration laws, which the courts had been
specifically exempting from constitutional criminal protections for a century
on the grounds that they were civil and not criminal. Prior to Padilla, there
was no expectation that any deportation grounds had to be evaluated or
justified penologically, so they never were. While Congress did indeed pass
the criminal deportation provisions, it never made a substantive penological
judgment as to their appropriateness as a scheme for criminal sentencing.
Thus, the rationale in favor of giving broad legislative deference to statutory
provisions—that the legislature has already given “deliberate, express, and full
legislative consideration” to imposing deportation as part of a criminal
penalty191—would be without foundation, and the deference that would
consequently be due the provisions under ordinary Eighth Amendment law, in
the form of the gross disproportionality standard and a presumption that
legislation reflects the values of the nation regarding sentencing policy, is not
properly applicable in the case of deportation for crimes.
Without the limits imposed by the strong legislative deference of ordinary
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, courts should apply a robust standard of
proportionality to deportation when it is imposed as part of a criminal penalty.
This review should consist of the same balancing factors identified by the
courts in Eighth Amendment review: the severity of the crime, the severity of
the penalty, and relevant characteristics of the offender. In the context of

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

130 S. Ct. at 2025.
Id.
Id. at 2026.
Id.
Id.
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deportation, the latter would include a consideration of the individual’s
immigration status, as well as her history and ties to the community. As the
first decision-makers to consider the appropriateness of imposing deportation
as part of the criminal penalty, courts should not hesitate to make the
substantive penological judgment as to the proportionality of that sanction.
There is little doubt that many deportations that are mandated or triggered
by our current immigration law would undoubtedly fail to meet a standard that
requires simple proportionality, and this reading of the Eighth Amendment
could protect thousands of individuals and their families from suffering the
disproportionate penalty of deportation for relatively minor offenses.
CONCLUSION
Our immigration law has lost any semblance of concern for proportionality
in how it imposes deportation for crimes. In the past decades, and especially
since 1996, the United States has deported tens of thousands of individuals—
including tens of thousands of long-term permanent residents—because of
criminal convictions.192 The provisions of the immigration law that allow such
deportations are in many cases mandatory, permitting no relief from the
sanction of removal and additionally prohibiting the individual from ever
returning to the United States. While such provisions might be justified for the
most serious of criminal offenses, their current sweep includes a very large
number of non-violent and relatively minor crimes which are classified as
“aggravated felonies,” including such offenses as petty theft with a one year
suspended sentence and failure to appear in court on criminal charges with a
potential two year sentence.193 In many of these cases, the penalty of
deportation seems clearly disproportionate to the offense, especially for
individuals who stand to permanently lose lawful resident status in the United
States.
We have taken the Supreme Court at its word in Padilla v. Kentucky and
consider removal that is triggered solely by a criminal conviction to be “part of
the penalty” for criminal activity.194 We have also considered that such
192. In 2011 alone, Immigration and Customs Enforcement removed 215,698 persons
convicted of felonies or misdemeanors, a record-high number for the agency. See Press Release,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, FY 2011: ICE Announces Year-End Removal
Number, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities Including Threats to Public Safety and National
Security, (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washington
dc.htm. Specific information on annual removal figures is made available annually by the
Department of Homeland Security in the Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. See Yearbook of
Immigration Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/pub
lications/yearbook.shtmhttp://www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/publications/yearbook.shtm (providing
an archive of removal statistics) (last updated Oct. 12, 2011).
193. 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43) (2006) (defining crimes which constitute an “aggravated felony”).
194. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010).
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deportation may likely come within the reach of the Eighth Amendment’s
principle that punishment for a crime should be graduated and proportionate to
the offense for which it is imposed, and looked at how Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence might be applied to deportation that is imposed as a criminal
sanction. Because Congress has never substantively evaluated criminal
deportation provisions as sentencing policy, we argue that courts should apply
the Eighth Amendment to those provisions in the form of a simple
proportionality standard, directly considering the severity of the offense, the
severity of the penalty, and relevant characteristics of the offender regarding
culpability. One response to this analysis of the Eighth Amendment’s
application to removal for crimes is for courts to step in, as we have argued,
and review the proportionality of removal as a criminal sanction. This could
take the form of the review of individual cases in which deportation may be
disproportionate to the offense. It might also take the form of consideration of
categorical challenges to certain aspects of the criminal removal scheme at
large, such as the “aggravated felony” provisions and their inclusion of
manifestly minor offenses. The latter is particularly intriguing because of the
aggravated felony provisions’ explicit prohibition on any discretionary relief
from removal that might otherwise act as a mechanism to correct for
disproportionate results.
Alternatively, Congress could take up the task of substantively considering
the penological value and proportionality of deportation as a sanction for all of
the many criminal offenses by which it can be triggered in current law. If
Congress were to carry out such a substantive review, thereafter the usual
Eighth Amendment standards would apply, and deportation would only be
prohibited if it were grossly disproportionate to the underlying offense. To be
meaningful, however, this review would have to be far-reaching and would
have to seriously consider the penological rationale for imposing deportation
for the many minor offenses currently included in the law. At the least, we
think this review would require a reworking of the aggravated felony definition
to limit its severe and automatic sanctions to the most serious of crimes and,
ideally, the inclusion of mechanisms to allow criminal sentencing judges to
preclude the sanction of removal and immigration judges to cancel removal
when it would be disproportionate to the underlying offense.195

195. Congress could also take immigration consequences seriously as part of criminal
punishment and develop a system of graduated immigration-related penalties to parallel graduated
criminal penalties. Juliet Stumpf has proposed a system of graduated immigration penalties that
could include an extension of the waiting period for eligibility to naturalize, a finding and stay of
removal analogous to a suspended sentence, fines, or a period of probation in which any further
violation would result in deportation. See Juliet P. Stumpf, Penalizing Immigrants, 18 FED.
SENT’G REP. 264 (2006).
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The current paralysis of Congress with regard to enacting substantive
immigration legislation leads us to believe, however, that major revisions to
our immigration statutes are not on the horizon. Until such time as that
changes, long-term permanent residents and other noncitizens will likely
continue to have to look to the courts to protect them from the disproportionate
sanction of deportation for minor crimes. In the wake of Padilla, the Eighth
Amendment gives them a tool to do just that.

